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Secured Obligations 22
The scope of this discussion probably is best defined in the words of
the act itself as appear in section 302 (I): "obligations secured by
mortgage, trust deed, or other security in the nature of a mortgage ·
upon real or personal property, owned by a person in military service
at the commencement of the period of military service"; and the problems herein discussed are those which arise under the act in connection
with the sale, foreclosure, seizure, or repossession of property which is
security for such obligations.23
Pertinent provisions of the act. Briefly stated, the act provides 2 ,1,
that secured obligations, originating prior to military service, on real or
pei-sonal property owned by a person when he entered military service,
and which he still owns, cannot be legally foreclosed, and the property
which is security therefor cannot be sold, seized or repossessed
( whether under a power of sale, judgment entered upon warrant of at-

22 BALDWIN AND CLARK, LEGAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY SERVICE ( l 942) contains
a concise summary of Relief Acts, together with full text of the acts in amended form.
23 Included within the broad language above quoted would seem to be all transactions in' which a lien upon property is given as security for the payment of a debt.
However, in § 301 the framers of the act have chosen to make special provisions for
conditional sales contracts and bailment lease agreements, presumably on the ground
that in such transactions title remains in the vendor and the property is not 'owned'
by a person in military service.
24 § 302 (1), (2), (3), (4) of article III entitled "Rents, Installment Contracts,
Mortgages, Liens, Assignments, Leases," as amended by Act of 1942.
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torney to confess judgment, or otherwise) during the period of military
service or within three months thereafter, except pursuant to a written
agreement of the parties,25 unless upon order of the court. In any court
proceeding commenced during the period of military service to enforce such obligations, arising out of nonpayment or any other breach,
the court may, and upon application by the person in military service
shall, stay the proceeding,26 or make such other disposition of the case
as may be equitable to conserve the interests of all parties, unless the
court finds that the ability of the defendant to meet his obligations is
not materially affected by his military service. Wrongful sale, foreclosure, seizure, or attempt so to do, knowingly done, is made a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment. The act further provides in section 303 that where proceedings to foreclose a mortgage,
repossess property, or terminate a contract to purchase personal property have been stayed, the court may, unless in its opinion undue hardship to dependents of such persons in military service would result,
appoint three disinterested persons to appraise the property, and, based
on their report, order payment of such sum as may be just to the
person in military service or to his dependents, as a condition to the
allowance of the foreclosure, repossession, or termination prayed for. 21
Under section 306 the benefits accorded to a person in military service
under article III will be accorded to his dependents upon application
to the court, unless the court finds that the ability to meet their obligations is not materially affected by the military service of the supporter. In
the 1942 amendment a new article VII, entitled "Further Relief," was
25
§ 107, added by 1942 amendments, permits, inter alia, the modification of any
obligation secured by mortgage, trust deed, lien, or other security in the nature of a
mortgage, or the repossession, foreclosure, or sale of property which is security for any
obligation, pursuant to a written agreement of the parties thereto, or their assignees,
executed during or after the period of military service of the person concerned.
Under the provisions of this section, modification of F.H.A. mortgages is permitted, which provides for waiver of principal payments, but continued payment of
interest, insurance and taxes. See "F.H.A. Loans and the Civil Relief Act," 7 INSURED
MoRTGAGE PoRTFOLio, No. 3, p. 18 (1943), setting forth letter of F.H.A. General
Counsel of November 6, 1942, discussing the Civil Relief Act and F.H.A. rulings in
respect thereto. Also, Russell and Bridewell, "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act as Amended," 8 JoHN MARSHALL L. Q. 137 at 163-168 (1942), in reference to
amendments of F.H.A. regulations to conform with Civil Relief Act.
26
§ 204 provides that stay of proceedings may be for the period of military service
and three months thereafter. The matter of insurance under the act has been hereto. fore considered.
27
Note that§ 305, added by the 1942 amendments, provides that assignees of life
insurance policies upon the life of a person in military service may not exercise any rights
under the assignment unless upon leave of court; and further provides that liens for
storage of household goods, etc., of a person in military service may not be foreclosed
or enforced, unless upon order of the court.
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added, under which application may be made by a person in military service at any time during his period of service or within six rionths thereafter
for relief in respect to any obligation incurre<;l. prior to military service.
Under this article the court may stay the enforcement of obligations
for installment purchase of, or secured by mortgage on, real estate, for
the duration of military service, plus the period of the remaining life
of the contract, plus time equal to the period of military service, or for
any part of such combined period, subject to the payment of balance of
principal and interest in equal installments during such extended
period; as to any other obligation a stay of enforcement thereof may be
granted for the remainder of the period of military service, plus time
equal to the period of military service, or any part of such period, subject to payment of balance of principal and interest in equal periodic
installments during such extended period; in both instances the act
provides that such further relief may be "subject to such other terms
as may be just."
·
Nature of specific relief and when available. In this country the
legislation which we have employed for the relief of men in military
service, in 1918, in.1940, and, with a single exception, in the 1942 act,
has been limited to the suspension of remedies for the enforcement of
defaulted obligations, and has· not been aimed at the direct relief
(i.e. discharge) of the serviceman from his• obligations.28 The method
employed in achieving this declared end has been to bring under the
direct -supervision of the court all those proceedings, summary and
otherwise, theretofore available for the enforcement of obligations, and
to make it a matter of the court's discretion whether under all of the
circumstances enforcement of the remedy should be' permitted.
In order to obtain relief under section 302 a person in military Syrvice must demonstrate to the court's satisfaction the following facts: ( l)
that the obligation, from the performance of which relief is asked,
originated prior to such person's period of military service; 29 (2) that
exception in the I 942 act to which reference is made is found in § 304,
under which a lessee in military service is permitted to terminate any lease covering
premises occupied for dwelling, professional, business, agricultural or similar purposes
by notice in writing, with provision for a pro rata computation of rent to the effective date of termination; and the lessor is permitted to apply to the court for such
modification of and restrictions on the termination as justice and equity require.
29 The term "period of military service" is defined-in § IOI (2) as follows: "For
persons in'active service at the date of approval of this Act [October 17, 1940] it
shall begin with the date of approval of this Act; for persons entering active service
after the date of this Act, with the date of entering active service."
Sec. 106 was added by the 1942 amendments, which provides: "Any person who
has been ordered to report for induction under the Selective Training and-Service Act
of 1940, as amended, shall be entitled to the relief and benefits accorded persons in
military service under articles I, II and III of this Act during the period beginning on
· 28 The
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the property which is security for the obligation was owned by him at
the commencement of his military service and is still so owned; and
(3) that his ability to comply with the terms of his obligation is materially a:ffected by reason of his military service.
(1) Section 302 of the Relief Act, as passed in 1940, was made expressly applicable only to "obligations originating prior to the date of
approval of this Act [October 17, 1940]." 30 It is said that this provision was inserted for the alleged purpose of preventing the freezing
of credit of men of draft age, inasmuch as business people would be unwilling thereafter to enter into credit transactions with such men if they
were to be deprived of their legal remedies. 31 Such a provision had been
satisfactory in the 1918 act; but it was deemed to be inadequate when
it appeared that this war would last for a considerably longer period
and that many men were being drafted into military service who had
become liable on obligations contracted subsequent to October 17, 1940,
on the assumption that the draft age would not be extended-hence the
1942 amendment making section 302 applicable to obligations originating prior to period of military service.
.
(2) Under the second requirement listed above the courts have
given a rather liberal interpretation to the phrase "real or personal
property owned by a person in military service," and have held that an
equitable interest in such property is sufficient to bring such person
within the scope of the section; 82 but relief under this section may be
the date of receipt of such order and ending on the date upon which such person reports for induction.- • • ."
.ao Kendall v. Bolster, 239 Mass. 152, 131 N. E. 319 (1921), in which the 1918
act, containing a similar provision, was held inapplicable to a mortgage dated the day
prior to approval of the act, but which was not delivered or the consideration paid
until more than a month thereafter on the ground that-the "obligation" of the
mortgage did not arise before effective date of the act. (This problem would arise
under 1942 amendments only if the "obligation" arose after the beginni-ng of the
period of military service.) Also held, that the act was not applicable to a mortgage
given during the period of military service in renewal of a prior mortgage. Cf. Olsen
v. Gowan-Lenning Brown Co., 47 N. D. 544, 182 N. W. 929 (1921), holding the
l 9 I 8 act inapplicable where the obligation under a mortgage was extinguished by
foreclosure prior to the effective date of the act, even though the running of the
period of redemption was suspended while the mortgagor was in military service.
31
Senator Chan Gurney, S. D., 86 CoNG. REc. 12837 (1940). See Bendetson,
"A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors Civil Relief Act of 1940," 2 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. I at 31 ( l 940), where the economic reasoning behind the provision is attacked
as being faulty; it is therein alleged that the possibility of such "freezing" resulted
from the failure to treat separately the 'yarious classes of transactions covered in article
III.
82
In Twitchell v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., (Ariz. 1942) 122 P. (2d) 210,
where prior to induction the mortgagor's son had made mortgage and tax payments in
reliance on the mortgagor's promise to convey realty in consideration for such payments
and support, it was held that the son "owned" an equitable interest in real property.
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refused when it appears that defendant's equity will soon be eaten up
by delinquent interest, taxes, and costs of foreclosure. 33 The act does
not recognize the recording acts of the various states; 34 this of course
adds to the confusion and increases the difficulty of establishing who
are the "owners" of the property, to the satisfaction of subsequent
title examiners.
(3) The fact of military service is not of itself sufficient to establish a right to relief under section 302-it must appear that the ability
of the defendant to comply with the terms of the obligation is materially affected by his military service.35 In this connection the latitude of
·discretion which the court may exercise appears to be extremely broad;
in determining whether military service has had a "material effect" on
dependent's ability to perform the court may grant relief under section 302 (I) (b) and "make such other disposition of the case as may
be equitable to conserve the interests of all parties." 36 Of course this
33 Jenkintown Bank & Trust Co. v. Greenspan, 44 D. & C. (Pa.) 507 (1942).
Cf. Hunt v. Jacobson, 178 Misc. 201, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 661 (1942); Dietz v. Treupel,
184 App. Div. 448, 170 N. Y. S. 108 (1918).
34 There is nothing in § 302 "which limits its provision to owners of record or
to cases where the mortgagee in fact knew or had reason to know who the owner of
the ·property was." Hoffman v. Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank, 2 31 Mass. 3 24,
121 N. E. 15 (1918); and cf. Morse v. Stober, 233 Mass. 223, 123 N. E. 780
( I 919). But even though realty trust shareholders in service are "owners" within the
meaning of § 302, they are not entitled to a stay of foreclosure proceedings when the
trustees have appeared to defend. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lester, 234
Mass. 559, 125 N. E. 594 (1920).
35 The burden of establishing such "material effect" apparently is upon the defendant who is requesting the stay of proceedings. Bare allegation of army service is
insufficient-the court will take additional testimony to determine if a stay should
be granted-Jamaica Savings Bank v. Bryan, 175 Misc. 978, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 17
(1941). Cf. Dietzv. Treupel, 184App. Div. 448,170 N. Y. S. 108 (1918).
36 Cortland Savings Bank v. Ivory, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) (1941), where the defendant's income was reduced from $203.80 to $177.30 per month by reason of military
service, the court reduced monthly payments under an F.H.A. mortgage· from $44.33 to
$26.95; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Litke, - - Misc.--, 41 N. Y. S. (2d) 526
(1943)-soldier's income reduced from $60 per week to $50 per month-stay granted,
conditioned upon payment of $ 5 per month, to be applied on account of taxes, with
provision that such conditions might be modified if soldier's financial position improved;
Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Papa, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 57 (1941), before the court would grant
relief under § 302 it required a showing that receipts from property were less than cost
of upkeep, where mortgagor claimed relief by reason of military service. Railroad Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Morrison, 179 Misc. 893, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 319 (1943).
These miiiimum payments which are often required as_ condition for stay of proceedings are applied to payment of taxes, insurance, repairs, etc., so that no great
prejudice results to the mortgagee from the delay.
In Davis v. Brown, 45 D. & C. (Pa.) 76 (1942), the Pennsylvania court exercised
very wide discretion when it permitted stay of foreclosure proceedings on condition that
the mortgagee be permitted to manage the pr9perty, collect the rents, and that the
mortgagor deliver up possession of the storeroom and apartment he was occupying.
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broad exercise of judicial discretion makes it very difficult for an.;ittorney to advise his client as to just what effect the fa~t of military service
will have upon his civil obligations, but we can be reasonably certain, as
appears from the decisions, that ·the courts will attempt to weigh the
equities carefully and to administer the act as an instrument to accomplish substantial justice for all parties.87
Considerable objection was made to section 302 (3) of the 1940 act,
which prohibited sales "under a power of sale or under a judgment
entered upon warrant of attorney to confess judgment" unless upon an
order of sale previously granted by the court, because it was not broad
enough to cover foreclosure by entry and possession, such as is allowed
by many state statutes. 88 This situation was remedied, however, in the
1942 amendments, which prohibit, in the absence of ·a court order, any
"sale, foreclosure, or seizure of property"; but the application thereof
is limited to such acts done after the date of enactment of the l 942
amendments.80 Thus the familiar trustee's sales so widely used in many
states, with a saving of both time and expense, appear to be gone for the
duration. If a record title is to be obtained which will not be open to
subsequent successful attack by a person in military service alleging that
he was prejudiced by the foreclosure,4° or to objection by a subsequent
purchaser that the title is not clear, the only safe course to pursue is to
foreclose any mortgage under the order of a court of equity. 41 Such a
procedure of course is open to the complaint that the foreclosure machinery is slowed up considerably, but in view of the risks one must run
by pursuing an alternative course, it would seem to be the only advisable procedure in all cases; 42 and having to go into an equity court for
87

Davis v. Brown, 45 D. & C. (Pa.) 76 (1942).
Bell v. Buffington, 244 Mass. 294, 137 N. E. 287 (1923); Ebert v. Poston,
266 U.S. 548, 46 S. Ct. 188 (1925); Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Wendeborn, 19
N. ]. Misc. 496, 21 A (2d) 317 (1941). In the last case the mortgagee, upon default
under mortgage, exercised his right to demand possession, and, being refused, brought
ejectment action against the wife, who was tenant by entireties with husband in service;
it was held that the suit was merely for possession of the premises, not for enforcement
of any obligation under the mortgage, and that therefore no relief could be had by the
mortgagors. Furthermore, husband and wife were separated, •and no application for
stay had been made on husband's behalf.
39
In Bendetson, "A Discussion of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940," 2 WASH. & LEE L. REv. I at 25 (1940) the suggestion is made that even
though under the l 940 provisions summary foreclosure proceedings did not come
under § 302 (3), nevertheless such proceedings, when defendant obtained notice
thereof, might be brought before the court by application for injunction· pendente
lite-thus bringing the matter within § 302 (2).
40
Such an attack may be brought under § 200 (4).
41
Morse v. Stober, 233 Mass. 223, 123 N. E. 780 (1919).
42
As pointed out in Morse v. Stober, supra, a mortgagee who has foreclosed
without such an order of court assumes a heavy burden of proof that no person in military service has any interest therein when he undertakes to enforce specific performance
38
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such an order of sale, many attorneys feel that they might just as well
continue the proceep.ing'to completion in the equity court.
As set forth in the 1940 act, section 303 was very limited in its
operation, it being expressly provided that proceedings to resume possession of a motor vehicle, tractor, or accessories of either, could not be
stayed unless :fifty percent or more of the purchase price had been paid;
and because of its limited nature it was the object of much criticism.43
In the r 942 act an entirely new section was substituted which was designed' both for the relief of creditors and for the benefit of persons in
!Ililitary service who had an equitable interest in property which was
being foreclosed or repossessed. As amended, section 303 now provides
that in any action to foreclose a mortgage on, or to regain possession of,
personal property the court may order an appraisal of the interest of
the person in military service, and require payment of a sum equivalent
to the value of such interest as a condition to foreclosing, provided that
the retaking of such property does not put an undue hardship on the .
mortgagor's dependents. Because of the nature of chattels and their
rapid rate of depreciation, such a provision was necessary in order to
protect creditors from the terrific loss which an extended stay of foreclosure or repossession proceedings would entail without any material
benefit to the debtor in military service. The new section 303 seems to
be a very equitable solution of the problem.
Because of the modern widespread practice of borrowing money
upon the cash value of life insurance policies and the fact that such
policies may be converted into cash upon default of the loan without any
court action, the drafters of the r 942 amendments deemed it wise to
include in article III a new section 305, which prohibits the assignee of
a life insurance policy on the life of a person in military service, which
was assigned to secure payment of such person's obligations, from ex~r-:
cising, during the period of military service and for one year thereafter,
any right or option given by such assignment, unless upon order of the
court or written agreement of the parties or when the premiums are due
of his agreement to convey good title to such land, but, however difficult, it is not a
burden of proof incapable as a matter of law of being sustained.
In Petition of Institution for Savings in Newburyport, 309 Mass. 12, 33 N. E.
(2d) 526 (1941), the court held that there was no reason for refusing to issue a new
title certificate to a purchaser at foreclosure sale where the land court, after investigation, foui;id that there is no interested person in military service, even though such
finding may be wrong and a person in military service might later come in and upset
the foreclosure sale by showing an equitable interest in the property which was not
apparent at the time ~f foreclosure.
' 43 See Connor, "Section 303 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act," 17 lND.
L. J. 285 (1942), containing criticisiµs of§ 303 and suggested corrections, which were
largely adopted in 1942 act.
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and unpaid or on death of insured.44 Provision is also made in this
same section to prevent foreclosure of storage liens on household goods
or personal e:ffects stored for the period of military service. This situation is probably covered in section 302 ( 1) ("other secµrity in the nature
of a mortgage"), but by way of double precaution it was apparently
deemed wise to enumerate the situation of a lien for storage charges and
assure court supervision of any enforcement thereof.
A glaring inadequacy of the 191 8 act, which was not remedied in
the 1940 act, was demonstrated in the case of Great Barrington Savings
Bank v. Brown,4 5 where a stay of proceedings was denied to defendant,
a widow entirely dependent on her sons in service for support and for
funds for previous mortgage payments, because she was not "a person in
military service." Section 306 of the 1942 act remedied this situation by
extending to dependents of a person in service all the benefits under
article III accorded to a person in military service. This amendment,
together with section 300 ( 2) giving relief to landlords whose tenants
have gone into military service, and article IV which extends government aid to insurance companies, indicates a considerable expansion of
the scope of civil relief as heretofore understood by our legislators.
Certainly there can be no contention that such an extension should not
have been made; rather the question comes to one's mind as to whether
it should not be extended still further-for example, the mortgagee
who is largely dependent for support upon income from his mortgages
should be entitled to apply for relief when he finds that his ability to
meet his own obligations is impaired by his loss of income from mortgagors who have gone into military service, even as a landlord similarly
situated now may obtain relief.
Passing mention also should be made of section 103 ( 1) of the act
under which persons who have guaranteed the payment of secured obligations may obtain a stay of proceedings in instances where the persons
primarily obligated on the instrument are persons in military service
and have been granted a postponement.46
44 Premiums guaranteed under article IV are not deemed to be due and unpaid
during the period of military service or for two years thereafter.
45 239 Mass. 546, 132 N. E. 398 (1921).
46 Under § 103 (1), as amended by the Act of 1942, relief may be granted to
"sureties, guarantors, endorsers, accommodation makers, and others, whether primarily
or secondarily, subject to the obligation or liability••••"
Cf. In Jamaica Savings Bank v. Bryan, 175 Misc. 978, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 17
(1941) in a foreclosure proceedings where wife was owner of the property and with
her husband who was in military service was liable for the mortgage debt, the court
said that a stay as to the husband would not necessarily involve a stay for the wife, but
under§ 103 (1), they being liable on the same obligation, it might be granted. Court
required more evidence as to wife's income in order to determine whether as to her the
proceeding should be stayed.
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Further refief. Two of the major objections which were directed at
the Relief Act in its r940 form were: (I) that a debtor in military service must remain at the mercy of his creditor, and wait for him to take
some affirmative action to enforce his claim before the debtor could
obtain relief under the act; and ( 2) that all accrued indebtedness became due within ninety days after the termination of the period of
service. Both of these objections seem to have been adequately taken
care of in article VII, entitled "Further Relief," which was added in
the r942 amendments.· Under the provisions of that article a conscientious obligor may now take the initiative at any time during the
period of military service and within six months thereafter and secure
a postponement of the enforcement of his obligations. The type of
relief which the court may give under this article meets the second objection stated above--equaLinstallments of the unpaid balance of principal and interest may be paid for the balance of the_ term of the contract
plus a period equal to the term of military service. In effect, the court
directs a reamortization of the obligation. The act does not indicate
what procedure is to be employed by an appliqi,nt seeking relief under
article VII, but it has been suggested that a declaratory judgment action would be an ideal remedy for a person seeking the protection of the
act. 47 Without the relief which article VII affords, it would seem that
the declared purpose of the act, "to relieve fighting men from financial
worries," could not be fully achieved, so long as they knew that huge
debts faced them upon their discharge from service, which required
satisfaction within ninety days. 48
General relief. The provisions of article III, in so far as they are
intended to cover proceedings and actions instituted in a court, apparently contemplate that the procedure set forth in section 200 should be
followed in cases where the defendant makes no appearance. 49 That
Anderson, "The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act," 6 UNIV. DETROIT
163 at 167 (1943).
48 It should be noted that the relief under § 700 added by amendments of 1942,
is not available to dependents of persons in military service; it would seem that some
such relief for reamortization of their ( the dependents') obligations should also be
available.
49 The following cases are cited in ANDERSON, LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS' AND
SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF AcTs, § II4, p. _140 (1941) as authority for saying that if
thc;re is a failure to file the affidavit required under § 200 ( 1) before the entry of default or failure to secure an order of court directing entry of the default, all the proceedings are void, and it is immaterial whether the defendant in military service has
been prejudiced thereby or not: Bobkoff v. Chesticoff, 24 Haw. 447 (1918); Blume
v. Battaglia, 28 Pa. Dist. 689 (1919). But the weight of authority is that such
requirements of the act are not jurisdictional - Shroeder v. Levy, 222 Ill. App. 252
(1921); Howie Mining Co. v. McGary, (D. C. W. Va., 1919) 256 F. 38-but are
merely voidable on a direct attack by the defendant in military service within ninety
47

L.

J.
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section provides that default judgments shall not be entered until
plaintiff files an affidavit stating facts showing whether defendant is or
is not in military service, or that plaintiff cannot determine the same.
If the affidavit does not show defendant not in military service, judgment shall not be entered without order of court, which shall not be
made if defendant is in military service until the court appoints an attorney to represent his interests, who shall not have power to waive
any of defendant's rights or bind him by his acts,5° and the court may
require a bond to indemnify such defendant from loss caused by the
judgment should the same be thereafter set aside; ·and the court may
make other orders necessary to protect defendant's interests. Further
provision is made that a judgment rendered in any such proceeding
against a defendant in military service may be opened on application to
the court made within ninety days after termination of his military
service, if he can show that he was prejudiced in making a defense in
such suit and that he had a meritorious defense to such judgment.51
However, the setting aside of any judgment under the act shall not
impair any right or title acquired by a bona fide purchasor for value
under the judgment.52
Section 202 of the act provides that fines and penalties shall not accrue during the stay of action on a contract; and that in any event the
court may relieve against such fine or penalty if the person who would
suffer thereby was in military service when the penalty was incurred.
It would seem that this section would relieve a mortgagor in service
from liability for "late charges" imposed for delay of payment, but
probably would not exempt him from the payment of interest on any
advances, as for insurance premiums or taxes, which the mortgagee may
have been required to make.
days after termination of such service on a showing that the judgment is prejudicial
and that he has a meritorious defense.
50 Davison v. Lynch, 103 Misc. 311, 171 N. Y. S. 46 (1918).
51 Combs v. Combs, 180 N. C. 381, 104 S. E. 656 (1920).
52 In such a case the only recourse the person in military service would have would
be against the plaintiff in the action in which the judgment was obtained, and upon
his bond, if any had been required under § 200 ( l).
See Taintor and Butts, "Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940," 13
Miss L. J. 467 at 480-481 (1941), and reference therein to 9 Miss L. J. 157 at
171-172 (1936), as to persons properly qualifying as bona fide purchasers under§ 200
(4); it is there suggested that "bona fide purchaser" should mean "stranger to the action."
Further discussion as to who is a bona fide purchaser under the act is found in
"Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940," 28 lowA L. REv. 14, at 23-26
(1942)-"by bona fide purchaser is meant one who purchases in good faith in reliance
upon the truth of the statements contained in the affidamt as to whether or not ,my
defaulting defendant is in the service, and upon the regularity of subsequent proceedings.''
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· Section 205 of the I 940 act provided merely that the period of military service should not be included in computing any limitation period
prescribed by law for the bringing ·of actions, whether brought by or
against the person in military service. The I 942 version of this section
.extends its applicability to include any "proceeding in any court, board,
bureau, commission, department or other agency of government," and
also makes provision that the period allowed by any law for redemption
of real property shall be extended by that part of the period of military
service which occurs after the effective date of the 1942 act. The specific inclusion in this _section of the right of redemption was necessitated
by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ebert 'U. Poston 58 that a right- to redeem real property was a substantial right and
not a right of action within the meaning of section 205 of the I 9 I 8 act
( which was carried over into the I 940 act) providing for exclusion of
period of military service from periods of limitation relating to "actions."
It is to be noted that the applicability of this amendment to the extension
of the period of redemption is limited to that part of the period of
military service which occurs after October 6, I 942, the date of approval
of the I 942 amendments; this limitation was necessary in order to avo~d
the constitutional objection of a taking of property without due process
of law which would inhere in a legislative enactment which attempted to
_remove the bar of the redemption period after the bar had become complete by the running of the period and an indefeasible title had vested
in the purchaser.54
.
It is the general concensus of opinion, that the Civil Relief Act in its
present form is adequate to meet the needs of the serviceman. Of
course the real test of its adequacy will not come until after the end of
the war; but there would seem to be little doubt that the servicemen
will get fair and equitable treatment under the act in view of the very
broad discretionary powers given to the courts. However, in order to
58 266 U.S. 548, 45 S. Ct. 188, (1925), reversing the Michigan Supreme Court
in 221 Mich. 361, 191 N. W. 202 (1922). Cf. Wood v. Vogel, 204 Ala. 692, 87 So.
174 (1920), holding that the right of redemption is not a property right, but is "a
mere personal privilege accorded by the statute, to be exercised in the manner and
within the time prescribed by law."
54 Campbell v. Holt, II5 U.S. 620 at 623, 6 S. Ct. 209 (1885); Stewartv. Keyes,
295 U.S. 403 at 417, 55 S.Ct. 807 (1934). It has been suggested in "The Soldiers~ and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1942," 12 FoRo. L. REv. 153 at 160 (1943)
that "no apparent objection on constitutional grounds would have been present if the
amendments had provided that the period of redemption would be extended by the
entire .period of military service so long as the period of redemption had not expired
on the effective date of the amendment; this ... would have had the added advantage
that the treatment of the right of redemption of all persons in military service would
be the same."
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insure substantial justice, the government must inform such persons
leaving military service as to their legal rights-to leave them in
ignorance of their remedies would certainly defeat the purpose of the
act.
Benjamin M. Quigg, Jr.

